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The role of the industrial relations system in the post-war decline of the
British economy, and its manufacturing sector in particular, appears to
be clear-cut and incontrovertible. Craft-dominated trade unions con-
trolled the shop-floor and prevented management from introducing
improved methods of work organization and reforming industrial
relations. In the absence of productivity bargaining, the performance of
British manufacturers suffered in comparison with the United States
and European economies. By the 1970s British economic performance
relative to the early post-war period was unfavourable to poor. 
Stephen Broadberry’s book, although a major work of empirical
econometric research, presents this qualitative matter-of-fact conclu-
sion on industrial relations with only perfunctory reference to histori-
cal material. This weakness casts doubt on Broadberry’s overall
assertions on trade unions and industrial relations, which appear to
draw firm conclusions about the British industrial relations system
without sustained engagement with, or even reference to, the available
literature. Industrial relations scholarship has failed to engage with and
dispute this type of approach.1 This review essay attempts to counter
both tendencies. It divides into four sections: (1) the main arguments of
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1. I have made this point in a wider historical context: I. Clark, ‘Institu-
tional Stability in Management Practice and Industrial Relations: The
Influence of the Anglo-American Council for Productivity, 1948–1952’,
Business History 41:3 (1999), pp. 64–93. 
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Broadberry’s book; (2) an examination of its research base and its
wider framework; (3) the book’s central arguments and how other
authors address the topic; (4) an examination of the characterization of
production and productivity during the early post-war and the con-
temporary periods.
The book’s main arguments
The Productivity Race contains four core arguments that run through
each section of the book. First, the period since 1850 has witnessed a
substantial comparative decline in Britain’s overall labour productivity
in the manufacturing sector, yet Britain’s comparative level of labour
productivity appears stationary (pp. 1, 395). Labour productivity in
American manufacturing is twice the British level, whereas productiv-
ity in the British and German manufacturing sectors show a broad
equality over the whole period. However, while the UK pulled ahead in
the early post-war period, West Germany gained over the UK in the
1970s. The contemporary period since 1979 saw free-market reforms in
the labour market and in industrial relations once again increase
British levels of labour productivity in the manufacturing sector in
comparison with Germany. The blame for Britain’s relative economic
decline therefore lies beyond the performance of the manufacturing
sector. Trends in other sectors of the economy and the effects of struc-
tural change appear, if only by assertion, of greater significance than
the performance of the manufacturing sector. 
The second core argument addresses the UK’s persistent manufac-
turing sector productivity gap with the United States. Three interre-
lated factors substantiate the case. Throughout the post-war period
until 1979, British attempts to introduce American mass- or volume-
production methods were on the whole unsuccessful.2 A major factor
in this failure was the presence of well-organized craft labour that was
controlled and mobilized by lay activists at the point of production.
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2. Broadberry uses this term throughout the book. However, the notion of
mass production is a matter of debate. For example, Clark demonstrates
that for British manufacturers in the immediate post-war years the focus
of American ‘best practice’ was standardization and simplification, not
necessarily mass production: Clark ‘Institutional Stability in Manage-
ment Practice and Industrial Relations’, Bus. Hist.. Equally, Lyddon
argues that the term ‘mass production’ is misleading, suggesting that the
phrase refers to the scale of production rather than its process; that is,
mass production does not necessarily rely on or require specialist man-
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Trade unions either frustrated attempts by management to introduce
standardized volume-production or prevented management from con-
sidering it. Here, the role of workplace restrictive practices appears par-
ticularly significant. Even when the state, employers and managers had
an opportunity to reform the structure of manufacturing industry and
its associated patterns of industrial relations, each erred on the side of
caution. However, trade-union resistance to change appears as the sig-
nificant factor (pp. 398–9).
The third core argument suggests that, while the failure to introduce
standardized volume-production during the post-war period explains
Britain’s manufacturing productivity gap in comparison with the
United States, the movement to that basis for manufacturing was not
at that time viable (pp. 13, 396). The UK emerged from the Second
World War in 1945 dependent on diverse Empire markets that
accounted for approximately 50% of its exports until the early 1970s.
This aspect to the overall argument appears peculiarly Kaldorian, 
particularly if one bears in mind the second core argument that high-
lights the role of trade unions in Britain’s failure to move to volume-
production systems in manufacturing.
Nicholas Kaldor’s explanation of the UK’s comparatively poor
economic performance over the post-war period is authoritative
because of its recognition of non-economic factors; it remains signifi-
cant today.3 Kaldor demonstrates convincingly that because post-war
macro-economic management secured full employment very quickly,
successive governments felt no need to change the institutional
framework in industrial relations.4 For example, governments recog-
nized the utility of continuing with existing patterns of joint regulation
between employers and organized labour as laid out in the 1944 White
Paper on full employment.5 Kaldor further argues that the then current
pattern of domestic economic management, later termed ‘stop–go’,
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agement techniques, and hence the term ‘volume production’ appears
more appropriate: D. Lyddon ‘The Myth of Mass Production and the
Mass Production of Myth’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations 1
(March 1996), pp. 77–105.
3. N. Kaldor, The Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth in The
United Kingdom (Cambridge University Press: 1966); idem, ‘Conflicts in
National Economic Objectives’, Economic Journal (EJ) 81:1 (1971), pp.
1–16; idem, ‘Capitalism and Industrial Development: Some Lessons
from Britain’s Experience’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 1 (1977),
pp. 193–204. 
4. Kaldor, ‘Conflicts in National Economic Objectives’, EJ, p. 3.
5. Ibid.
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succeeded because it aimed to mitigate rather than overcome the long-
term adverse trend in the UK’s international competitiveness.6 Institu-
tional and political factors, such as Britain’s industrial relations system,
had only marginal impact upon post-war economic decline. In the
wider context of the post-war aims and objectives of the British state,
economic performance could not have been better than it was.7 For
Broadberry, the UK’s post-war productivity gap in manufacturing
resulted from a failure to introduce American methods of production.
However, the evidence suggests that diverse British markets at home
and abroad appeared ill-suited to volume production, as well as craft
trade unions finding unacceptable the potential de-skilling associated
with volume production. 
The difference between Kaldor and Broadberry revolves around the
issue of industrial relations. Kaldor concludes that state policy on
exchange rates, international relations, the sterling area and Imperial
export markets imposed significant constraints on the domestic
economy and that, in this wider context, post-war economic perfor-
mance was very good relative to the recent past. This conclusion
suggests two points that limit Broadberry’s broad-brush assertions on
industrial relations. First, post-war economic management, particu-
larly the constraining effects of stop–go policies, aimed to maintain
Britain’s wider role in the international political economy. Second,
Imperial markets appeared ill-suited to standardized volume goods on
the American model. Hence, with continuity in markets and methods
of production, one marginal factor such as industrial relations could
not inhibit economic performance measured in the wider context. In
contrast, Broadberry suggests that workplace industrial relations
represent a key factor in the deterioration of post-war economic per-
formance. 
In order to explain Broadberry’s position on trade unions, and in
particular why they appear more significant than other institutional
and political factors identified by Kaldor, it is necessary to turn to the
fourth argument in The Productivity Race. The overall performance of
the British economy has been disappointing since 1945, yet poor per-
formance in manufacturing appears confined to the period 1950–79
(pp. 397–8). The years 1979 to 1990 saw Conservative governments,
committed to the ideology of the market and the reform of workplace
industrial relations, reverse the process of comparative economic
decline. New systems of manufacturing technology created more
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6. Ibid., p. 15.
7. Ibid.
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flexible production methods with an emphasis on customization and
skilled labour. 
The connection between the third and fourth core arguments of The
Productivity Race centres on the alleged presence of mistaken
economic policies during the post-war years that undermined compar-
ative economic performance until the 1980s. The state maintained and
managed a deficient institutional structure where slow growth markets
had the effect of subsidizing physical capital; state ownership was wide-
spread but inefficient; and voluntary reform of the industrial relations
system was a failure (pp. 13–16, 398). These factors combined to
provide poor vocational training, while industrial relations practices
created unemployment. Thus the wider institutional structure that sur-
rounded the manufacturing sector limited its economic performance. It
was not until changes in the bargaining environment and associated
developments in industrial relations during the 1980s that the UK’s
productivity gap with other European states decreased. In summary,
until the 1980s the state effectively failed to support employer strategies
associated with volume production and failed to recognize that
Imperial markets could not sustain competitive growth in labour pro-
ductivity in the manufacturing sector. In particular, the final core
argument asserts that successive post-war governments allowed restric-
tive and obsolete patterns of industrial relations to undermine the
potential for volume production in much of the manufacturing sector. 
Recognition of this failure became clear only when Conservative
governments reformed industrial relations, restricting the impact of
multi-unionism and associated restrictive practices. The market values
and assumptions of Austrian economics, dominant in the UK since the
1980s, have presented institutions such as trade unions and processes
such as collective bargaining as distortions of the market mechanism
that can only damage economic performance.8 The view mobilizes an
ideological campaign designed to isolate the post-war industrial
relations system as the primary cause of economic decline in the period
until 1979. More critically, the assertion appears fragile in terms of his-
torical method, for it revises or ignores much of the established quali-
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8. For a critical account of Hayek’s attacks on employment and trade
union rights, see Lord Wedderburn, Employment Rights in Britain and
Europe (Lawrence and Wishart: 1991), chapter 8, ‘Freedom of Associa-
tion and Philosophies of Labour Law: The Thatcher Ideology’. For an
analysis of Hayek’s ‘new right’ theory of the state, see P. Dunleavy and
B. O’Leary, Theories of the State (Macmillan: 1987). For a sympathetic
treatment of Hayek, see J. Tomlinson, Hayek and the Market (Pluto:
1990).
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tative literature and documents as ‘revisionist’ and ‘unconvincing’
archive-led accounts.9
The research base and its wider framework
The research detailed in The Productivity Race is a re-examination of
the performance of the British manufacturing sector since 1850 using a
framework of technological evolution over three periods, 1850–1914,
1914–50 and 1950–90. Part one of the book establishes the long-term
pattern and trend of productivity in the American, British and German
manufacturing sectors. Part two explains these patterns of productivity,
highlighting the parallel development of volume-production and
flexible-production techniques. For Broadberry, standardization and
customization in output and associated skill levels in the labour force
appear as key analytical factors, explaining the superior efficiency of
American volume-production techniques. To establish how British
manufacturers failed to introduce such techniques, part two of the
book assesses the role played by technology, markets, investment in
human and physical capital, and competition. Apparently, unlike their
German counterparts, British manufacturers failed to sustain flexible
patterns of production or a highly skilled labour force. Part three turns
to a detailed evaluation of productivity in all branches of manufactur-
ing.
The three historical periods each receive a prefix – ‘the rise-of-com-
petition from abroad’, ‘war and depression’ and ‘changing markets and
technologies’ – and while the four core arguments flow through each
part of the book they are particularly telling in the last. In summary,
Broadberry’s framework leads to a reassessment of the performance of
British industry that posts the following factors as significant explana-
tions of Britain’s relative economic decline. First, in the period to 1914
British performance did not so much decline as did US and German
performance accelerate. Second, in the period to 1950, world wars
punctuated by depression pushed Britain into a pattern of industrial
production and international trade dominated by Imperial markets
that eschewed standardized volume production. Third, between 1950
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9. Broadberry, in his work jointly published with Nick Crafts, has previ-
ously aired this view and been subject to criticism from Clark in ‘Insti-
tutional Stability in Management Practice and Industrial Relations’,
Bus. Hist., J. Tomlinson and N. Tiratsoo, ‘An Old Story Freshly Told? A
Comment on Broadberry and Crafts’ Approach to Britain’s Early Post-
War Economic Performance’, Bus. Hist. 40:2 (1998), pp. 62–72. 
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and 1990 Britain found itself servicing comparatively low-value, low-
productivity export markets with cumulatively deficient levels of plant,
equipment and technology.
The research base and framework offer detailed productivity mea-
surements combined with qualitative industrial and business history.
However, the significance of this approach is not so much its authority
or its credibility but the manner by which its conclusions undermine
the work of industrial relations scholars and those from other disci-
plines with an interest in industrial relations. This is because what
appears to emerge from each core argument are the corrosive and
sclerotic effects of the industrial relations system on Britain’s post-war
economic performance. This argument appears credible and is signifi-
cant precisely because it contains too little qualitative industrial and
business history and virtually no analysis of the industrial relations
system.
The industrial relations system and the failure of ‘American’
volume production
In many respects the generality of three of the core arguments in The
Productivity Race appears persuasive. Over the long run, Britain’s pro-
ductivity performance in comparison with the United States and
Germany is poor; equally, in the post-war period, Britain held neither
the appropriate markets nor an inclination to manage a strategic intro-
duction of volume-production systems into the manufacturing sector.
However, the final core argument is historically flawed and appears to
contradict the first core argument.
Broadberry asserts that whereas the comparative performance of the
British economy did indeed disappoint during the period from 1950, its
performance since 1979 represents a significant improvement.
Moreover, reform of the industrial relations system represents the major
factor in this process. The power of trade unions and the failings of the
economy resulted from mistaken economic policies that undermined the
UK’s long-run economic performance. The presentation of chance and
mistake as explanations for historical causation has a long pedigree.
However, as plausible historical method they are insignificant. 
E. H. Carr demonstrates that chance and mistakes are unconvincing
for two reasons.10 First, the notions of accident, chance or mistake
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10. E. H. Carr, What is History? (Penguin, Harmondsworth: 1987), chapters
4 and 5. 
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imply a counterfactual interpretation of history – arguments and con-
clusions that run counter to a generally agreed position.11 A particular
methodological problem encountered by counterfactual approaches is
a reliance on hypothetical arguments that pose alternative courses of
action based on negatives; for example, what would the situation have
been if Americanized systems of volume production had been intro-
duced by British firms in the post-war period? Broadberry suggests that
if the UK had moved to US volume- or flexible-production systems,
post-war economic performance might have been better than it was.12
In large measure, improved performance would follow on from better
management systems for work organization and workplace industrial
relations. The second and related reason why the notions are uncon-
vincing relates to causation. To governments, employers and, in all like-
lihood, trade unions, past decisions that now appear as mistakes,
accidents or the result of chance are not necessarily so. Such decisions
may result in unfavourable consequences, yet an alternative course of
action could not and did not prevail because alternative courses require
alternative patterns of causation. That is, it is impossible to conclude
with any authority that Britain’s post-war economic performance was
held back by a failure to adopt volume- or more flexible-production
systems. The issue of causation reprises the authority of Kaldor’s
approach. Kaldor establishes that post-war economic policy, including
that on industrial relations, was not mistaken, the result of chance or
an accident. In contrast to these potentially counterfactual possibili-
ties, Kaldor’s formulation on post-war economic and industrial
relations policy describes not the ideal that economists prefer but the
situation that actually prevailed.13
HISTORICAL STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 9140
11. For example, Alan Milward argues that the failure of the Marshall plan
proves that it was not necessary to maintain the UK’s post-war output
boom prior to 1947. Milward suggests that the Marshall plan did indeed
help to maintain the boom but without it the British government would
have found an alternative way to avoid a post-war recession: A.
Milward, ‘Was the Marshall Plan Necessary?’ Diplomatic History 13:2
(1989), pp. 231–53; idem, The Reconstruction of Western Europe
1945–1951 (Routledge: 1984). 
12. This case has been put forward by C. Barnett, The Lost Victory: British
Dreams, British Reality, 1945–1950 (Macmillan: 1995). Barnett’s
argument has been subject to sustained criticism; see Clark, ‘Institu-
tional Stability in Management Practice and Industrial Relations’, Bus.
Hist., and J. Tomlinson, ‘Corelli Barnett’s History: The Case of
Marshall Aid’, Twentieth Century History 8 (1997), pp. 222–38.
13. Kaldor, ‘Conflicts in National Economic Objectives’, EJ, pp. 14–16. 
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The counterfactual element in Broadberry’s argument is also retro-
spective in its promotion of free-market values. In this respect one
arrives at the conclusion that mistaken post-war policies on the
economy and the industrial relations system only appeared so in the
context of a future alternative direction for policy – one that ‘meant an
end to the terrible industrial relations disputes of the 1960s and 1970s’
(p. 398). To argue that if volume-production systems in the post-war
period were only partially implemented then industrial relations might
not have been so problematic indicates only a loose grasp of historical
method. Equally, it is difficult to prove one, let alone two, negatives.
Moreover, as Carr further demonstrates, a particular event will
commonly have several causes – economic, political, ideological, short-
term and long-term.14 To paraphrase Carr, merely stating that the
Second World War started because Hitler wanted war is true enough,
but explains nothing.15 The same argument applies to industrial
relations: stating that poor industrial relations caused Britain’s
economic decline in the post-war period may be true but it explains
nothing. Industrial relations appear as a proximate explanation, one
that requires further explanation within other short-term and long-
term causes. 
A further problem for industrial relations specialists who focus on
the historical or the contemporary is the significance that proximate
explanations appear to hold within atypical and non-historical agendas
that are dominated by managerial and prescriptive interests. For
example, Richard Hyman notes that until recently any text on British
industrial relations would emphasize the importance of history, in par-
ticular the trinity of industrial relations traditions: voluntarism, free
collective bargaining by trade unions, and unscientific management by
employers.16 The erosion of this framework has been followed by the
reconstruction of management as human resource management. This
generalizes a set of research priorities that promote the economic and
political interests of employers and the state and that exclude consider-
ation of employee interests, defined either collectively or individually.17
A discussion of Broadberry’s four core arguments through the filter of
more qualitative and less econometric literature may counterbalance
CLARK: BRITISH MANUFACTURING IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 141
14. Carr, What is History?, p. 89.
15. Ibid., p. 87.
16. R. Hyman, ‘The Historical Evolution of British Industrial Relations’, in
P. Edwards (ed.), Industrial Relations (Blackwell, Oxford: 1995).
17. J. Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations: Mobilization, Collectivism and
Long Waves (Routledge: 1998), chapter 2.
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the priority and significance attached to the role of industrial relations
in post-war decline. 
Corelli Barnett argues that Britain failed to restructure its manufac-
turing sector in the immediate post-war period because of the state’s
obsession with ‘great power’ status and its fear of trade-union resis-
tance.18 Hence the Attlee government wasted Marshall aid on debt
retirement to maintain the sterling area instead of restructuring the
manufacturing sector into larger integrated units, while gradually
removing wartime controls on the industrial relations system. The
latter set the train of voluntary patterns for job regulation and dispute
resolution that remained until the Conservative reforms of the early
1980s. Barnett’s approach appears convincing, but it isolates the
apparent strength of the organized working class to resist change from
the actual disinterest that employers and managers had in American
systems for volume production. This is particularly the case in Barnett’s
treatment of the early post-war years, when the weight of evidence
indicates that employers and the state were preoccupied with security
of product markets rather than product innovation.19
Anthony Carew provides a more fruitful, if controversial, explana-
tion for the failure to introduce American production techniques in the
UK.20 He demonstrates that the significance of scientific management
lay not necessarily in its practice but in its propaganda value during the
Cold War. Marshall aid and associated businessmen’s programmes
during the 1950s had one aim and one lasting achievement. By the
1960s the programmes had finalized a split in the international labour
movement to reinforce the anti-Communism in much of European
labour. Over the medium term, the late 1960s saw the emergence of
workplace productivity bargaining (a central element of job regulation
in American volume production) as the key theme in the reform of
British industrial relations. More significantly, Carew asserts that Allan
Flanders was an early convert to the merits of productivity bargaining
in the early 1950s during his editorship of Socialist Commentary.
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18. Barnett, The Lost Victory; see also C. Barnett, The Audit of War: The
Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation (Macmillan: 1986).
19. Clark, ‘Institutional Stability in Management Practice and Industrial
Relations’, Bus. Hist.; Tomlinson, ‘Corelli Barnett’s History’, Twentieth
Cent. Hist.
20. A. Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan: The Politics of Productivity
and the Marketing of Management Science (Manchester University
Press: 1987).
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In summary, Carew argues that the failure of scientific management
in the early post-war period was less significant than its role in mobi-
lizing the labour movement against Communism. Of greater impor-
tance, the comparative failure of productivity bargaining in British
industrial relations illustrates one effect of inappropriate production
systems, size of markets, and employer and management interests. In
this respect Broadberry echoes two of Carew’s conclusions, but the
latter’s third conclusion, on employer short-termism, is equally signifi-
cant as it moves the debate beyond trade unions and collective bar-
gaining.
A further perspective on the failure of American volume-production
techniques in the post-war period demonstrates that the state and
employers had little interest in the economic and institutional restruc-
turing necessary to sustain them.21 Documentary sources illustrate
quite clearly the opposition of British employers to standardization in
production on three counts. First, the British manufacturing sector did
not serve a large standardized market; on the contrary, British manu-
facturers served highly differentiated domestic and export markets.
Second, many British firms were small in comparison with their US
counterparts, serving localized markets or niche export markets; for
example, in the late 1940s 70% of the UK labour force in the manufac-
turing sector worked in units employing fewer than 500 workers.22 The
evidence suggests that diversity of end-user requirements was consider-
able. The Federation of British Industry (FBI) cited examples of steel
manufacturing, metal window frames, gear-cutting equipment and
cooker hobs.23 To standardize output would require amalgamations
and mergers plus significant investment in new plant, machinery and
assembly-line systems. Many companies argued that these measures
were inappropriate and too expensive to consider – a course of action
that was likely to lose already established markets rather than to help
to improve market share.24 Furthermore, as Keith Middlemas points
out, many firms had price-fixing and cartel arrangements in Imperial
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21. Clark, ‘Institutional Stability in Management Practice and Industrial
Relations’, Bus. Hist., pp. 71–9.
22. ‘Size of UK Manufacturing Plants, October 1948’, Anglo-American
Council for Productivity (AACP)/Federation of British Industry (FBI)
papers, MSS 200 F/3T/328/1, Modern Records Centre, University of
Warwick (MRC).
23. ‘Industrial Standardization in the UK’, AACP/FBI papers, MSS 200
F/3T/328/1, MRC.
24. Ibid.; see also Clark, ‘Institutional Stability in Management Practice and
Industrial Relations’, Bus. Hist.
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markets, deemed a situation preferable to competing in the US market
or the emerging western European market in the 1950s.25
Third, evidence for the early post-war period suggests that many
employers saw US-inspired volume production as a threat to tradi-
tional management styles. For example, the demonstration of statistical
and quantitative methods to British representatives on Anglo-
American Council for Productivity study trips to the United States
found many British representatives poorly prepared. In some sectors of
manufacturing industry, systems for work organization, pay systems
and job allocation appeared so informal that the calculation of pro-
ductivity levels, unit costs and manning levels proved almost impossi-
ble.26 In general, employers appeared to prefer craft methods of
manufacturing as opposed to ‘scientific’ systems, because they were
efficient enough for the markets that British firms supplied. Equally,
craft methods, regulated as they were by national agreement, kept the
negotiation of industrial relations matters outside the workplace. The
evidence suggests that the FBI and many managers also feared that a
movement to workplace industrial relations would erode management
control.27
In the post-war period, especially during the 1950s, the FBI and the
Trades Union Congress both lobbied for free collective bargaining
implemented through national agreements. This appeared to be the
appropriate course of action for companies because of the continuity
with the inter-war period in markets, management and work organiza-
tion. Such continuity allowed for stability in patterns of job regulation,
including workplace restrictive practices.28 In some sectors, notably
engineering, companies preferred national agreements that they could
then use to undermine union activism in the workplace.29 For many
companies this position represented one of the major post-war miscal-
culations by British management, which in part contributed to the
emergence of the informal system of industrial relations during the
1960s. However, this pattern of industrial relations followed from
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25. K. Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State, Vol. 1 (Macmillan:
1986).
26. See AACP, Productivity Team Report for Iron and Steel (AACP: 1952),
p. 13.
27. Clark, ‘Institutional Stability in Management Practice and Industrial
Relations’, Bus. Hist., p. 78.
28. Ibid., pp. 77–9. For historical material, see F. Zweig, Productivity and
Trade Unions (Blackwell, Oxford: 1951).
29. J. Hinton, Shop Floor Citizens: Engineering Democracy in 1940s Britain
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham: 1994).
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employer decisions, the primary motivation for which lay beyond the
intransigence of trade unions and collective bargaining. 
Employer decisions were not necessarily mistaken; instead, the
approach of management may have been necessary but consequential
in the wider economic and political context of state policy. The key
issue is tracing the route of causation for the pattern of industrial
relations in the 1960s and 1970s. Trade-union intransigence and restric-
tive practices did not necessarily cause this, but both resistance strate-
gies were responses to the use of established systems of work
organization and associated patterns of industrial relations in very
tight post-war economic conditions. For example, in the late 1960s
both Graham Reid and H. A. Turner argued that a central difficulty for
industrial relations reform was the presence of disorderly pay struc-
tures and informal systems of workplace industrial relations that
appeared of marginal significance to employers and managers in the
conditions of post-war economic boom.30 A movement to volume stan-
dardization in production and a pattern of productivity bargaining
regulated in the workplace appeared as a low priority for the state for
two reasons. First, non-standard markets in the sterling Imperial area
represented at least 50% of the UK’s total export market. In the short-
to-medium term these markets were irreplaceable. Second, the UK was
a manufacturing economy that exported goods in return for imports of
food and raw materials. Allied to the determination of successive post-
war governments to sustain sterling as a reserve currency, this legit-
imized a post-war output drive sustained by extensive means –
considerable overtime working in conjunction with comparatively low
investment. The output drive had a considerable impact on labour pro-
ductivity and the labour market. Full employment worked in combina-
tion with employer preference for national agreements to create
resultant pressures in the industrial relations system.
For Broadberry, the comparative failure of volume production in the
UK during the post-war period is self-evident. However, for employers
and, more significantly, the state, this was not necessarily the case.
Equally, ‘the failure’ did indeed result in consequences for industrial
relations but trade-union policies reflected those of the state and
employers. As Broadberry observes (in his third core argument) the
movement to US volume production was not viable; but, on the basis
of the argument offered here and elsewhere, the viability of the decision
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30. G. Reid, ‘An Economic Comment on the Donovan Report’, British
Journal of Industrial Relations 6:3 (1968), pp. 303–15; H. A. Turner, ‘The
Donovan Report’, EJ 79:1 (1969), pp. 1–10. 
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did not turn on the power and intransigence of trade unions.31 Equally,
in the contemporary period since 1979 the weight of empirical evidence
suggests that the comparative performance of the British economy has
failed to improve, while the industrial relations system is now subject to
significant legal regulation.32
Productivity in the period since 1945
As The Productivity Race demonstrates, in the early post-war years the
UK emerged with a considerable productivity lead over its mainland
European competitors. But the UK’s comparative performance had
begun to deteriorate by the 1960s. In the early 1980s the comparative
performance of the UK manufacturing sector surged ahead of
European competitors; yet, as Broadberry’s concluding chapter
concedes, industrial output collapsed during the period 1989–92 and
had not recovered by the late 1990s. Hence it appears that, relative to
the early post-war period, and comparatively in relation to European
competitors, the British economy – particularly its manufacturing
sectors – remains in third place behind the United States and Germany
in the productivity race.
In the context of the wider aims and objectives of the state and
employers in the post-war period, industrial relations appears as one
factor that affected the performance of the British economy. In the con-
temporary period the reform of industrial relations has made little dif-
ference to the UK’s long-term trend in comparative economic
performance. Broadberry’s book argues that the failure to introduce
American production techniques is central to the UK’s productivity
gap with the United States and its comparative decline against the
German economy. However, the assertion that trade unions and col-
lective bargaining represent significant factors for employer and state
reticence in this area is not proven.
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